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20 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SS-47: Probable Effect of Recent Developments in Eastern Germany on Soviet Policy with Respect to Germany

~~DISSEMINATION~~

1. This estimate was originally prepared on a crash basis at the request of the DI/I for use at the Boardman conference scheduled for 6 July. Because of the original schedule, a draft was prepared in 6/22 without benefit of agency contributions. The text that emerged from the IAC representatives' meeting appears to be entirely satisfactory to all agencies except the JIC.

~~DISSEMINATION~~

2. The paper (para. 6) presents two basic alternatives open to the Kremlin in negotiations on German unification. The first alternative would be for the Kremlin to agree to the unification and neutralization of Germany on the basis of free elections and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and thus to relinquish Soviet control over East Germany. The second alternative would be for the Kremlin to negotiate for unification, but to object to any proposal involving the relinquishment of Soviet control over East Germany. The Board of National Estimates and all the IAC Agencies, other than JIC, estimate that the Kremlin will adopt the second alternative. The JIC representative advanced the proposition that the first alternative is "more likely". Since the JIC concurred in JIC-61 which estimated that the removal of Soviet troops from Germany is "only a remote possibility", (para. 1) and since its present position would imply a reversal in Soviet policy since 22 May (the date of JIC-61), it is my hope that General Porter will not press this position.

3. G-2 had some minor changes in wording that were not adopted at the close-up session, but I do not believe they will raise them at the IAC.

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